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INTRODUCTION
We are grateful to the seminar participants and to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. where the formal registration of title is supposed to provide a definitive record of estate ownership." 6 The courts, in a similar vein, have described the (pre-2002) operation of adverse possession as "apparently unjust", 7 with Neuberger J recently observing that it was:
"…hard to see what principle of justice entitles the trespasser to acquire the land for nothing from the owner simply because he has been permitted to remain there for 12
years."; a conclusion which "…does not accord with justice, and cannot be justified by practical considerations [is] draconian to the owner and a windfall for the squatter". 8 Furthermore, the Law Commission"s re-designation of adverse possession as "theft of land", 9 as part of its work on land registration, has copper-fastened the portrayal of the squatter"s actions as wrong (tantamount to criminal activity), with the dispossessed landowner as the "victim" of the piece.
This article re-considers the way in which the moral responsibility of both squatter and landowner has been cast in this new legal order. The prevailing approach to adverse possession in England and Wales presents a simplified, "black-and-white" picture of unlawful occupation, which essentialises the landowner as "in the right" and the squatter as acting wrongfully. In this article, we argue instead that the activity of unlawful occupation raises a series of complex questions relating to both the use of land and the regulation of title, which can usefully be considered by unpacking the variety of socio-legal constructions of squatter and landowner, and by considering the activity of unlawful occupation in relation to use of land as well as (registered) title.
In doing so, we have found it helpful to consider the legal construction of the squatter and the landowner through a range of legal lenses: crime; housing; limitation;
property; and human rights; as there is some difference of approach across these contexts, for example, as to whether the primary concern of the legal response is with the act (or consequences) of squatting itself, the acquisition of title through adverse possession, or a combination. The purpose of this analysis is to develop a "taxonomy of squatting" with which one might better evaluate the law in this area.
The idea of pursuing legal scholarship though the development of taxonomies is not without its critics, both within and beyond the UK legal academy. 10 In the context of English property law, the activity of classification has become strongly associated with the Birksian taxonomy of private law, 11 which, briefly stated, sought to identify a series of discrete categories into which legal rights, obligations, claims and outcomes would be "mapped", to evaluate the "rightness" of a decision by its ability to fit into the appropriate category, and to use the resulting taxonomy to direct the future development of the law along certain rational, clearly identified channels. This article does not purport to contribute to this project: as the "keepers of the squatting taxonomy" 12 it is not our goal to set out a "rational taxonomy" of legal responses to squatting, or of adverse possession, but rather to set out a "formal taxonomy" through which we can better understand the complex and significant twists and turns which the law has taken in this field in recent years.
The purposes of such a "formal taxonomy" were usefully explored in a recent paper, in which Emily Sherwin analysed the role and function of legal taxonomies.
13
Sherwin considered two competing models of legal taxonomy: (1) the "reason based taxonomy" applied by Professor Birks, whereby legal rules and decisions are classified according to "legal principles", and the resulting taxonomy is employed to determine future decision making, and (2) the "formal taxonomy", a process by which efforts are made to classify legal materials according to rules of order and clarity.
Sherwin noted that while a reason-based taxonomy seeks to identify "high-level decisional rules", formal taxonomy "serves less ambitious objectives, such as facilitating legal analysis and communication". xxxv-xliii; P. Birks, "Definition and Division, A Meditation on Institutes 3.13", in P. Birks (ed) The Classification of Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); P Birks, "Equity in the Modern Law" (1996) 26 Western Australian Law Review 1. 12 Birks refers to "the keeper of the trusts taxonomy", for example, in section IV.D of his lecture "Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment", published at (1999) Sherwin as based in a recognition that: "[c]lassification plays a necessary role in legal analysis: to think and argue clearly about law, we need to organize the raw material of legal rules and decisions into more general categories. Yet, surely these general categories should correspond to the reasons that under lie the law. Only then will they be of practical use as guides to legal decision-making." In a recent article, 18 the present authors analysed the impact of the LRA 2002 on the doctrine of adverse possession in registered land. This article argued that the reforms set out in that Act, while presented as a practical response to the incongruities between "title by registration" and acquisition of title by squatters, also implemented a contentious moral agenda in relation to advertent squatters and to absent landowners.
Furthermore, it was noted that while these provisions will have important practical and philosophical consequences, the Law Commission has attempted to close off any prospect of further debate on the subject, without explicit consideration of important contextual matters, for example, the contemporary social and housing issues associated with urban squatting, or the matrix of moral issues at stake in such cases.
Yet, the implicit emergence of a moral agenda in relation to adverse possession in indicates a debate that has clearly not been resolved at the highest levels.
In identifying a series of squatting taxonomies, this paper views the activity of squatting broadly, and focuses on legal responses to both the use of property and the acquisition of title through adverse possession. The object of the exercise is not to attempt to fit the law into a rational scheme, 19 as a "reason-based taxonomy" would require, but rather to pursue what Sherwin describes as a "formal taxonomy", that is, by mapping the range of legal materials which deal with squatting issues in order to better understand "the purposes and principles that animate legal decision making."
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For this reason, the discussion focuses on the discursive tropes that underlie the various responses to unlawful occupation in contemporary English law. This analysis is necessary, in part, because these responses are scattered across legal topics, both public law and private law. Nevertheless, several common themes can usefully be mapped across these contexts. These themes include questions of fault on the part of both the squatter and the dispossessed landowner, and the hardship likely to be occasioned upon each party in the event of alternative legal outcomes.
19 See Sherwin, above n 13, p2, describing the English taxonomical debate in the context of restitution and unjust enrichment. 20 ibid p4.
Legal responses to unlawful occupation, broadly defined, can be categorised across these fields of legal regulation, by focusing on four central factors which we have identified as significant in English law. The first of these is the identity of squatters as they have been constructed within legal discourses in the UK: the legal construction of squatters in English law presents particularly interesting scope for analysis in light of the strength of the negative social construction of unlawful occupation, evidenced not least by media portrayals of squatters, whether in relation to their use of land, or the acquisition of title through adverse possession. 21 The second factor relates to the type of property subjected to unlawful occupation, which can range from empty residential (publicly or privately owned) property to commercial property, urban or rural property, and, of course, also including what are often very small amounts of property in the context of boundary disputes. The third factor is the squatter"s motivation for committing the trespass -and law"s response to this: whether the trespass is committed under a mistake, as may be the case in a boundary dispute; with a view to deliberate acquisition of title; or with the intention to use the land for the time being, perhaps because the squatter has nowhere else to live.
The fourth and final factor is the legal response, across the range of principles and policies considered in this paper, to the conduct of the landowner: that is, whether the landowner is regarded as blameworthy or at fault.
By organising our discussion around these four variables, we hope to identify coherent patterns in the law -a "formal taxonomy" -with a view to enhancing legal analyses and evaluations of recent and significant shifts in the law and policy of adverse possession. Once again, these taxonomies are not intended to identify legal principles which would act as a constraint on future legal decision making; rather the object is to shed light upon the moral principles that we believe to be implicit in both legislative and judicial policy. In the following sections, we seek to organise the diverse legal materials relating to squatting and adverse possession across the ambit of English law as they can be positioned against the matrices of fault and hardship. We then proceed to consider how this taxonomy can help us contextualise recent judicial 21 See, Cobb and Fox, above n 2, footnote 4 and associated text; see also K. 
LEGAL RESPONSES TO UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION
The provisions by which the activities of squatters are regulated in law are scattered across a wide range of legal contexts. This section focuses on the ways in which this multiplicity of contexts obscures a range of underlying attitudes towards the activity of squatting and towards the morality of both the squatter and the dispossessed landowner. This focus on morality reflects the central, but implicit, role that moral perspectives -whether in relation to the squatter"s unlawful occupation or the landowner"s fault or neglect in failing to effectively supervise the land -have had on recent developments in the law of adverse possession. This section begins by mapping the law regulating unlawful occupation as it has developed in the context of criminal law, housing, and property law. The following section will then consider the impact of human rights discourse, as manifested through the Pye litigation, in transplanting constructions of the squatter and the dispossessed occupier in English law, into a broader international forum.
Although this paper embarks on the process of classifying law"s approach to unlawful occupation by focusing on morality, it is important to emphasise that this is only one aspect of what we see as a wider "meta-map" of legal regulation in this context. As Figure 1 indicates, across the spectrum of English law, legal discourse has emphasised a range of competing (and overlapping) perspectives on unlawful occupation: the need to act in the interests of economic efficiency, to respond to the problem of housing need, to treat squatters as a "social problem" to be addressed through law and policy, or to focus on the (im)morality of unlawful occupation. It is also useful to bear in mind that, across these contexts, the objective of regulation varies: so, for example, while both the criminal law and housing are concerned with the activity of squatting as it impacts on the use of land, property law is primarily concerned with the consequences of squatting in relation to the acquisition of title through adverse possession. The primary role of the meta-map is to highlight the ways in which legal discourses concerning squatting are moulded by the values and priorities of different branches of the legal system. For instance, the criminal law approach to squatting has developed to reflect a continued moral panic around the "urban squatter". In contrast to this, the housing perspective places considerably more emphasis on the importance of economic efficiency in the use of land, particularly residential property, and the need to ensure that property is effectively utilised to serve housing needs. We also consider the impact of the LRA 2002 by identifying the way in which the shift in property law"s approaches to squatting has reflected both the construction of squatters as a social problem and the emergence of a new morality agenda in relation to adverse possession.
A. Criminal Law
Despite the popular perception of squatting as a criminal activity, often criticised as threaten violence to secure entry to any premises when it is known that there is someone present on the premises who is opposed to the entry"; 24 which means that unless the squatter voluntarily yields up possession, the landowner must obtain a court order before it will be possible to recover the land.
The only circumstance in which squatting has been criminalised in English law (as a criminal trespass), and where the police have enhanced powers to act, is when squatters displace the occupiers of residential properties. 25 These provisions do not apply to non-residential, or empty residential properties, where the control of squatting is left to the civil law. The criminalisation of squatting in only these limited circumstances bears some useful analysis in relation to the four key factors identified in the introduction to this paper. Furthermore, as figure 2 demonstrates, this analysis can in turn be mapped in terms of the "fault" of each party -the squatter and the landowner -and the "hardship" each will suffer, depending on the nature and extent of legal intervention.
Firstly, in relation to the identity of the squatter, criminal law regulates squatting only when the squatter displaces an occupier from the home which they currently occupy. In these circumstances, it is clear that fault is firmly fixed upon the squatter, especially vis-à-vis a landowner who is, at the time, in occupation of the property.
The type of property to which this provision applies is also significant: only occupied residential property -that is, property which is currently in use as a home -is protected in this way by the criminal law. Displacement from one"s home, distinct from displacement from any other type of property -is likely to cause particularly serious hardship to the landowner. 28 Yet, when considering the squatter"s motivation for trespass (and despite the arguments that might potentially be made in this context relating to homeless squatters), hardship for the squatter is not regarded as a relevant factor by the criminal law. Although squatters who target residential property often do so because they wish to use the property for accommodation, in some cases because they are homeless, to do so at the expense of someone else"s home is, for English law, the trigger for criminalisation. Finally, we note that a landowner who is directly displaced from current occupation of the property cannot be regarded as being at fault since he or she has not been careless, has not neglected or abandoned the property, but was making appropriate use of the property as a home at the time of the dispossession. However, the reasoning behind this allocation of fault differs fundamentally in the housing context, compared to that which emerged in the context of crime control. injustices of local authority housing allocation procedures, 33 housing policy inevitably favours a principled, bureaucratic system of housing allocation, which can take account of factors such as need or welfare interests, over the "who dares wins" of urban squatting. 34 Furthermore, urban squatting of empty homes has been identified as a barrier to bringing these vacant properties back into official "use".
CRIMINAL LAW
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The presence of squatters is said to render the "emptiness" of the property less evident to the local authorities which are now charged with a clearly defined duty to maintain and enhance the health of the housing market, including identification of empty properties, across a range of tenures. 36 In particular, local authorities owe a statutory enforcement duty to impose Empty Dwelling Management Orders where owners either cannot be identified or are unwilling to bring the property back into use.
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Finally, the construction of urban squatting within housing policy as a serious social problem is tied to concerns about the impact of squatters on neighbourhoods, as a reflection of the historic connection between urban squatting and neighbourhood "anti-social behaviour". wastefulness can be read as implying that landowners who leave their property empty have failed in some broader duty towards society as a whole, by squandering the valuable contribution that the housing resource holds for the well-being of communities, as a resource for use, for economic regeneration, and (in part, by preventing the growth of squatting) for neighbourhoods. The website for the Department for Communities and Local Government clearly sets out that department"s concerns with empty properties, which is worth quoting at length:
Anyone who is unfortunate enough to have lived next door to a property that has been left empty for a long period of time will understand the sheer frustration and misery such a situation can create. Poorly maintained empty properties are not only unsightly and unattractive, they seriously reduce the value of adjoining properties.
As the government department responsible for shaping housing policy in England, how the existing housing stock is used falls squarely within
Communities and Local Government"s remit. It is important to maximise use of the existing housing stock so that we can minimise the number of new homes that need to be built each year, particularly in areas of the country where housing demand is high, such as the south east of England.
Empty homes not only restrict housing supply, they also detract from the quality of the local environment and can cause significant problems for local residents. Poorly maintained empty homes attract vermin, cause damp and other problems for neighbouring properties and are magnets for vandals, squatters, drug dealers and arsonists.
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From this perspective, landowners who allow their properties to lie empty are constructed less as "victims" who experience hardship at the hands of squatters, than as acting "at fault" vis-à-vis neighbouring occupiers, owners, the neighbourhood, and society at large (through the correlation made between empty properties and antisocial behaviour), and, crucially, as failing to make effective use of the housing resource. The development of the Government"s "Empty Homes" agenda has parties seeking to establish possession. Furthermore, these principles applied across the full range of circumstances in which unlawful occupation of land took place:
factors such as the identity of the squatter, the nature of the property, the squatter"s motivation for trespass and the conduct of the landowner were ostensibly irrelevant.
Yet, while this "one size fits all" approach to adverse possession by limitation did not appear to distinguish between different circumstances of squatting, it is clear that the doctrinal definitions of "possession", "intention to possess" and "adverse" did give the courts some scope to respond to the context of the unlawful occupation. In fact, we would agree that "judicial reluctance to assist squatters has manifested itself in a number of different ways." 43 For example, when considering whether the squatter has established factual possession of the property, English courts are typically reluctant to find the true owner to be out of possession if there is any evidence that he or she is still in control of land. 44 The presumption of lawful possession means that the slightest acts of control by the landowner will generally suffice to indicate that he or she is still in possession of the property. 45 Similarly, restrictions on the potential for successful claims of adverse possession have developed through the requirement that the squatter"s possession must be adverse. The "implied licence" theory, applied in a series of cases from the late nineteenth century, 46 was based on the proposition that, in order to be "adverse", the squatter"s possession must be inconsistent with the landowner"s future plans for the use of the land -otherwise, the landowner was deemed to have granted an implied licence to the squatter, so rendering his or her possession to be by permission rather than adverse. This seems to support a construction of the landowner as tending to leave land unused for good economic reasons, for example because of future plans for development: thus, the landowner is not at fault for leaving the land unused for the time being, making the loss of title to the land (and the opportunity to carry out the future plans) a disproportionate hardship. years is a long period during which to neglect a property completely." 51 Where the landowner has made no effort to control the land, it is easier both to view the landowner as bearing some blame for the loss of the land, and to consider the burden of hardship relatively lighter than it would be were the landowner still at least attempting to secure his possession. Reciprocally, this could also be regarded as giving the squatter in this context -who may be viewed as less blameworthy since he or she is making use of land over which the owner has failed to exercise control -a morally stronger claim to eventual title.
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One variable that could have enabled the courts to pursue a more explicitly moral approach to adverse possession is the distinction between "good faith" and "bad faith" adverse possession. The good faith/bad faith distinction is employed in many 47 Limitation Act 1980, Sched 1, para 8(4), which provides that there shall not be an implied licence due solely to the fact that occupation is not inconsistent with the future use of the property. 
D. Adverse possession and the Land Registration Act 2002
To the extent that property law was ostensibly neutral to the moral questions of fault and hardship in unlawful occupation, everything changed with the "new legal order" stated: in order for a squatter to obtain title to registered land, the squatter may, after being in adverse possession for ten years, apply to the Land Registry to be registered as proprietor. 55 Crucially, however, the squatter has no entitlement to be registered at this stage. The Land Registry must then respond by sending a notice to the registered proprietor (and others with registered interests in the land), informing them that an application has been made by the squatter. 56 Recipients of such a notice are given 65 business days in which to object to registration of the squatter as proprietor, and it is, generally, only if there are no objections that the squatter will registered with title to the land at this stage. that the squatter has some other entitlement to be registered (eg an estate contract, inheritance); or the dispute concerns a boundary; then the squatter can be registered as proprietor even though the landowner has objected. On the other hand, if the squatter"s application does not fall within one of these limited exceptions, and the registered proprietor does not take steps to physically remove the squatter (ie by issuing a writ for possession) within a further 2 years then the squatter can re-apply to the Land Registry, at which point the squatter will be entitled to be registered as proprietor.
The reforms to the law of adverse possession in the LRA 2002 were primarily justified within the context of the Act as a whole, which sought to sharpen the system of registered land, to become a system of title by registration (as opposed to registration of title). However, the Law Commission papers that preceded the Act 60 also disclosed a strong moral stance on the immorality of squatting, 61 which undoubtedly had a powerful impact on both the proposals themselves and the relative lack of opposition with which they have been met, both before and after enactment. where there is an estoppel in favour of the squatter; where the squatter has a beneficial entitlement to the property by some other means (eg an estate contract or by inheritance), and where the dispute concerns a boundary and both the claimant squatter and the landowner were mistaken as to the position of the boundary. 65 When considering the identity of the squatter, the nature of the property, the squatter"s motivation for trespass and the conduct of the landowner, it is possible to track how the fault/hardship balance shifts from the landowner to the squatter in each of these cases. For example, when considering the squatter"s motivation for trespass, it is significant to note that, in all three cases, these squatters are likely to have acted in good faith.
Firstly, in relation to estoppel, a squatter who can establish an estoppel against the landowner has already shown both that the landowner"s conduct adduces some element of fault (by making a representation or giving encouragement to the squatter concerning the ownership of the land), and that the squatter can be identified as not at fault -since by analogy with equitable estoppel, the squatter who fits within this exception can be viewed as needing "clean hands". Although the hardship of not having (use of) the land is potentially significant for both parties, the squatter appears to have a stronger claim to hardship in light of ten years or more of possession without fault, as well as the hardship argument based on preserving the status quo: that is, that the squatter is currently in occupation of the property.
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Secondly, in relation to the squatter who has an entitlement by some other means, it is significant that, again, the squatter cannot be regarded as being "at fault", even though the failure to complete by registration may have been the squatter"s omission, since his or her pre-existing beneficial entitlement means that, in substance, the lack of registered title can be viewed as a technicality. Perhaps more significantly, the balance of hardship is particularly striking in this context: since the squatter"s entitlement to the land amounts to an equitable interest which was acquired outside the context of the adverse possession, and the landowner"s interest is more akin to the position of a trustee, the hardship to the squatter, should the Land Registry fail to recognise his or her claim would be much greater than any hardship to the registered title holder.
A similar picture emerges in relation to boundary disputes -with the added implications of dealing with what are in reality likely to be very small amounts of land. The "squatter" has acted in good faith -so without fault -under a mistaken belief as to the location of the boundary. Similarly, the hardship to the landowner must be small, since, in order for the exception to apply, the registered proprietor must have shared this mistaken belief. Chamber unconvincing on its own terms. Second, we draw attention to a parallel process of reasoning within the dissenting judgements which opens up the potential for a more convincing understanding of the moral dimensions of adverse possession, which is rooted in the owner"s duty of stewardship in relation to her land. belonging to the company that adjoined the Grahams" farmland. However, after the agreement came to an end, the Grahams continued to use the land, and Pye made no further effort to prevent them from doing so. In June 1997 the Grahams registered cautions at the Land Registry against the claimant"s title to the land on the basis that they had obtained title by adverse possession. The land was then estimated to be worth at least £2.5 million. 68 At trial, the Grahams were found to be entitled to be registered as proprietors of the land. However, on a series of appeals before the UK 
LRA 2002 -GENERAL
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND THE PYE LITIGATION
A. Introducing the Pye litigation
B. Positioning Pye within the squatting taxonomies
In positioning the Pye litigation, it is useful to begin by noting two general points:
firstly, the both chambers of the European Court were ultimately unconvinced by the argument levelled by the applicants that the doctrine of adverse possession, derived as it was from the principle of limitation, was limited to an argument under Article 6 of the European Convention, which safeguards the individual"s right to due process. The courts concluded instead that, while challenges relating to the Convention-compliance of limitation periods had been considered with respect to Article 6 in earlier European jurisprudence, this did not preclude consideration of such provisions under other articles of the Convention. The chambers also both dismissed the claim of the applicants that P1-1 was not engaged because adverse possession constituted an incident of land ownership imposed at the moment of acquisition. There was therefore no doubt among the judges of both courts that P1-1 was engaged by the issues raised in relation to adverse possession.
Where the Chamber and Grand Chamber differed, however, was in their respective appraisals of the compatibility of the doctrine of adverse possession with the European Convention. The broad impact of P1-1 can be briefly stated, as comprising three distinct rules: 69 the first rule states the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule covers deprivation of possessions, and provides that deprivations can only occur subject to certain conditions; and the third rule recognises that states are entitled to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they might deem necessary for that purpose.
Interference by a state with an individual"s rights to property can be justified on the basis of the public or general interest. In short:
Measures which interfere with property rights must have a legitimate aim, and must be proportionate. They must also strike a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the general interest of the community.
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Indeed, it is now well-established that states are granted a wide margin of appreciation to take action interfering with an individual"s rights under P1-1. The European Court will accept a state"s own judgment about what is in the public interest, and the appropriate balance struck in pursuit of that public interest, unless it is found to be "manifestly without reasonable foundation".
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What follows is a brief appraisal of the judgments of both the Chamber and Grand
Chamber of the European Court in the Pye litigation, in which we begin to consider the subtly different forms of legal reasoning deployed in the majority opinions in both the Chamber and Grand Chamber, and designed to position the dispute in Pye within particular (competing) taxonomies of squatting. Before considering each of these competing taxonomies in detail, the following section presents three components of the European jurisprudence around P1-1 which formed the foundation for this "taxonomical struggle".
(1) European jurisprudence as the basis for moral taxonomies of squatting
The majority in both the Chamber and Grand Chamber sought to derive support for their respective positions from the (moral) priorities of European jurisprudence. In doing so, the courts were particularly keen to identify whether the doctrine of adverse possession was appropriately classified for the purpose of P1-1 as either a deprivation or control of use of property. This legal distinction, it was claimed, was central to an appraisal of the legality of the doctrine because of its implications for the question of Our analysis also illustrates how the legal reasoning of the European Court was influenced, in part at least, by the UK Government"s own powerful critique of the pre-2003 system. In particular, those judges opposed to the doctrine (both within the Chamber and Grand Chamber) deployed the wide margin of appreciation granted to individual states in relation to P1-1 to draw explicitly upon these domestic justifications when justifying the position of the European Court of Human Rights.
Finally, the courts" moral taxonomies were influenced too by the specific facts of the Pye litigation. As we have argued in earlier sections, adverse possession has different moral implications, in terms of fault and hardship, depending upon the circumstances in which it operates. For example, one may adjudge the transfer of land ownership under the doctrine more or less justifiable given the particular characteristics and conduct of landowner and squatter. The obvious question arising from this observation, of course, is the extent to which particular scenarios can, or should, be given weight over others by the European Court when assessing the legitimacy of the mechanism overall under P1-1. Indeed, the extent to which the general appropriateness of a complex legal mechanism like the doctrine of adverse possession can legitimately be assessed based on the specificity of its operation in a particular context has concerned the European Court in previous cases. The Court asserted in James v UK that its approach will vary depending upon the role of the state in the alleged infringement of P1-1. Where the alleged infringement is the result of an executive act by a public authority, the court will focus its attention upon the specific facts of the case. However, the approach changes when the state is challenged qua legislator, because the alleged infringement is the result of enforcement of that legislation by a private party.
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In such circumstances, while the case is brought as an individual grievance, it is the court"s duty to consider the compatibility of the legislative framework as a whole, rather than the specific factual context giving rise to the application to the court.
Nevertheless, in James v UK, the court went on to add that "this does not mean the Court will examine the legislation in abstracto." 73 Instead, the particular experience of the applicant must be treated as "illustrative" of the impact of the legislation in practice "and, as such, material to the issue of compatibility with the Convention."
74
The question begged by this proviso, however, is exactly how a court is expected to strike an appropriate balance between an appraisal of the general acceptability of a legal rule and its specific (potentially severe) operation in a particular factual context.
What the Pye litigation suggests, quite simply, is that both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber were able to manipulate the adjudicative discretion granted to them by this rule to move between the generality and specificity of the operation of the doctrine of adverse possession to reach the desired outcome. Most importantly, as the following sections demonstrate, the specific facts of Pye appear to have had a considerable impact upon the Grand Chamber"s appraisal of the doctrine of adverse possession as it applied in this case -to which the relevant law had been the pre-2003 provisionsparticularly in relation to the issue of the landowner"s fault. This moral discourse also dovetailed easily with contemporary P1-1 jurisprudence.
The Chamber noted that European jurisprudence provided states with a wide margin of appreciation when seeking to secure economic, social or other policies, so that it was only if a particular public interest objective was "manifestly without reasonable foundation" that the State"s interference with the applicant"s right would amount to a breach of the Convention. 82 The UK Government had attempted to set out two justifications for adverse possession before the Chamber: (1) the public interest in preventing the injustice and uncertainty arising from stale claims being brought against a squatter and (2) the public interest in ensuring that the unopposed occupation of land (as a physical fact) and its legal ownership coincided. The
Chamber rejected these objectives as irrational, deciding instead that "the uncertainties which sometimes arise in relation to the ownership of land are very unlikely to arise in the context of a system of land ownership involving compulsory registration, where the owner of the land is readily identifiable by inspecting proprietorship register of the relevant title at the Land Registry."
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The Chamber did accept that since the LRA 2002 had not abolished the doctrine entirely, the UK Government had not completely abandoned adverse possession as a doctrine; rather, it was implicitly presumed that the "public interest" against which the Nevertheless, the Chamber found in favour of Pye concluding that even on these criteria the balance struck by the pre-2003 legislative system was disproportionate.
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In reaching its conclusion the Chamber used European jurisprudence to deploy a particular moral construction of the operation of the doctrine of adverse possession that placed the hardship experienced by the landowner at the heart of its adjudication.
Undoubtedly, the most important issue identified by the Chamber was the loss of land by Pye without compensation, particularly in light of the lack of procedural protections in place under that system. 87 Regardless of the responsibilities associated with land ownership, lack of compensation was key to its view that the pre-2003 system did not strike a fair balance between the landowner"s right and the public interest. 88 Importantly, the Chamber concluded that the operation of the doctrine of adverse possession amounted to a deprivation (rather than control of use) of property.
Since ECHR case law provides that a failure to compensate a deprivation of possessions will always render a legislative system disproportionate unless . 87 Drawing upon the UK model, it was noted that: "[t]he unfairness of the old regime which this case has demonstrated lies not in the absence of compensation, although that is an important factor, but in the lack of safeguards against oversight or inadvertence on the part of the registered proprietor." (Pye v Graham, HL, above n 7). It is "draconian for the owner and a windfall for the squatter that just because the owner has taken no steps to evict the squatter for 12 years the owner should lose 25 hectares of land to the squatter with no compensation whatsoever" (ibid [71] , citing with approval the comments of Neuberger J Notable, too, was the court"s explicit reference to another aspect of the moral taxonomy: the fault of the landowner. The Chamber noted that the twelve year limitation period applied under the LRA 1925 allowed a relatively long window for a landowner to take action against a squatter. It also emphasised that "in order to avoid losing their title [the applicants] would have had to do no more than regularise the Grahams" occupation of the land or issue proceedings to recover possession within the 12-year period."
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The Grahams had written numerous letters over the years requesting a grazing licence but the company had failed to respond to this explicit notification of their presence on the land. As the dissenting judges concluded in their opinion:
the "real" fault in this case, if there had been any, lies with the applicant companies, rather than the Government. It has to be borne in mind that the applicant company was not a private individual or an ordinary company with, one could assume, limited knowledge on relevant real-estate legislation. They were specialised professional real-estate developers, and such a company had or should have had full knowledge about relevant legislation and the duties involved. Chamber, focused as it was on the issue of compensation for the UK government, must have been the inevitable consequence that a finding in favour of Pye would potentially expose both the UK Government -and perhaps other Member States in due course -to liability for compensation. 96 In direct opposition to the Chamber judgment, and supporting its dissenting judges, the Grand Chamber"s judgment was coloured by its explicit efforts to distance its reasoning from the reforms implemented dissenting judges in that case) that the Grand Chamber"s reasoning is both illogical and at odds with European jurisprudence and, as such, provides an inadequate basis for a defence of the doctrine.
At the very first stage of the court"s appraisal of the pre-2003 regime, the Grand Chamber considered again the public interest underpinning the pre-2003 regime of adverse possession. Like the Chamber before it, the Grand Chamber placed considerable emphasis on the margin of appreciation enjoyed by member states when assessing the "public interest", in the context of social and economic policies. Chamber relied on the case of Stubbings v UK 102 to argue that limitation periods were generally accepted by European jurisprudence as a legitimate aim of legislation, in pursuit of "legal certainty".
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The Grand Chamber"s reconstruction of the doctrine of adverse possession as merely a limitation mechanism has obvious consequences for its position within our taxonomies of squatting. Indeed, we would suggest that the court was intent on "demoralising" the issue of adverse possession, in order to avoid finding a breach of P1-1.
The prioritisation of the evidential objective of legal certainty rendered the "mechanism" of adverse possession a mere bureaucratic tool and, as such, downplayed its redistributive implications. Where moral assessment did emerge in the court"s decision, it was carefully tailored to emphasise the specific fault of Pye and to gloss over both the hardship caused to the company and the Grahams" bad faith. As the court concluded, while Pye was able to easily seek possession of the land over the preceding 12 years: 104 "in James [v UK] , the possibility of "undeserving" tenants being able to make "windfall profits" did not affect the overall assessment of the proportionality of the legislation…and any windfall for the Grahams must be regarded in the same light in the present case." 105 The Grand Chamber also exploited the distinction between deprivation and control of use to reinforce this moral construction. By reaching the conclusion that the operation of adverse possession as a limitation tool was a control of use, absence of compensation, so central to the
Chamber"s prioritisation of the hardship experienced by Pye, could be simply ignored.
Thus, the Grand Chamber judgment drew upon a variety of jurisprudential techniques to reposition the doctrine of adverse possession within a less morally contentious framework than that found within both UK political discourse (and originally reinforced by the Chamber). With hindsight, however, it remains evident that the pre-2003 system of adverse possession cannot rationally be justified solely on grounds of evidential concerns regarding title in a system of registered land, nor can it be justified on grounds of overall predictability of title within the land system. One might argue that the legal certainty that the Grand Chamber referred to was not evidential, but was an attempt to claim that limitation periods are justified by settling long possession in favour of a squatter. Yet even this justification for limitation periods cannot be asserted in a system of registered title. Furthermore, as Gray and Gray note later in this essay, the emergence of moral arguments relating to "reciprocity" -the "community value" interest in land as a resource, and the risk that private land rights may be trumped by some over-arching community interest -creates obvious tensions with the individualist model, and as such has been constrained to situations in which compensation is available, or where land use regulation pursues the "common good" as part of the "environmental contract" between the state and the community. Better land access and more secure land rights encourage investment in the land and respect for the environment. This mitigates competition for, and pressure on, land and natural resources, while also maintaining productivity.
Land rights also entail a duty of efficient and productive use.
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While the case of farmland in Oxfordshire may seem a world away from the developing societies with which UN-HABITAT are primarily concerned, or the Shari'a law communities of the Islamic world, these discussions of the duty of stewardship over land as a natural resource provide an interesting foil to the English approach, which is explicitly predicated upon taking all necessary steps to protect the paper title holder who does not use -and, more importantly, does not exercise stewardship over -his or her land. to depriving a registered landowner of his beneficial title to the land except by a proper process of compulsory acquisition for fair compensation.
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It is interesting to consider this suggestion against the discussion above, which considered the arguments surrounding squatters and the empty homes debate in the UK: applying the proposition that unused land (in the form of empty homes) should be brought back into use, it is important that any system directed at encouraging more economic use of land should -rather than permitting the "who dares wins" of squatting -proceed on a principled, bureaucratic basis, giving due consideration to the question of compensation for the landowner who may have no use for the land, but does not wish to be divested of its exchange or capital value.
Attempts, in the course of the ECHR stage of the Pye litigation, to defend the pre-2003 doctrine of adverse possession on grounds of the prioritisation of economic development, were, for good reason, not successful. We would argue, however, that the economic development argument does not adequately capture the duty of stewardship as we would conceptualise it in relation to land. Rather, we would contend that an appropriate duty of stewardship is founded, not on an obligation to develop land, but in an obligation to ensure effective oversight of that land. At the heart of the dissenting judges" opinion in the Grand Chamber judgment is the proposition that:
Possession (ownership) carries not only rights but also and always some duties.
The purpose of the relevant legislation was to behove a landowner to be vigilant to protect the possession and not to "sleep on his or her rights". The duty in this particular case -to do no more than begin an action for repossession within 12 years -cannot be regarded as excessive or unreasonable.
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It is this requirement of "vigilance" that crystallises the "stewardship" perspective on adverse possession, and which -rather than emphasising the unfairness of the regime for landowners -re-imagines the law of adverse possession as a regulatory system which enforces a duty of stewardship upon landowners. argument to be made, that, in fact, stewardship rather than efficient land use provides the most cogent objective of a doctrine of adverse possession in a system of registered land. All landowners can be regarded as owing a duty of stewardship in relation to their land, even if they do not wish to make use of that land at the present time.
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What is particularly interesting about this conceptualisation of the duty of stewardship argument is that it inverts the Law Commission"s own implicit squatting taxonomy:
no longer is the focus upon the fault of the squatter and the hardship on the landowner; instead, it is the fault of the landowner in failing to oversee his or her land that forms the new core of the doctrine.
In relation specifically to the fault of the squatter, it is noteworthy that the final dissenting judgment of the Grand Chamber in Pye v UK focused on the consequential significance of a system like adverse possession, which may be perceived as: …not intended to deprive paper owners of their ownership, but rather to regulate questions of title in a system in which, historically, 12 years" adverse possession was sufficient to extinguish the former right to re-enter or to recover possession, and the new title depended on the principle that unchallenged lengthy possession gave title.
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The Grand Chamber then proceeded on the basis that where title is extinguished as part of a control of use, the strict rules relating to compensation for deprivation of property no longer apply. Accordingly, "exceptional circumstances" were not required to justify the lack of compensation in this case. The Grand Chamber concluded that limitation periods depended for their operation upon a lack of compensation.
One potential hurdle in applying this analysis, however, might be that the Grand
Chamber distinguished James v UK by emphasising that the public interest in enforcing limitation periods did not pursue a social policy of transfer of land ownership which was clearly founded upon an intention to deprive the paper owners of title. Yet, the distinction currently drawn in European jurisprudence between a "deprivation" and "control of use" is oblique at best, and it is arguable that, in line with the argument accepted in James v UK, in the context of adverse possession there is no intention on the part of legislators pursuing a duty of stewardship to deprive landowners of their property, but merely a desire to control their use of the land through the deterrent effect of the hardship of such loss, and so encourage landowners to maintain effective scrutiny and stewardship over their unused property.
A final issue to confront might be the degree to which a truly blameless landowner might still fail to identify a squatter on his or her land for the full twelve years. This was clearly of great concern to the Law Commission when it designed its proposals,
claiming that under the law as it then stood, land could be lost to a squatter under the doctrine even where the landowner had taken reasonable steps to keep the land under effective scrutiny, specifically because squatters may not be readily identifiable, particularly because they keep a low profile. In the latest edition of Gray & Gray"s Elements of Land Law, the authors claim that "the possession which founds a claim for adverse possession must be open, notorious and unconcealed. It must be such that it would be noticed by a documentary owner "reasonable careful of his own interests"". 126 This common law rule seems to provide a convincing protection for diligent landowners against "undiscoverable" squatters. Only those, like Pye for 126 Gray & Gray, above n 6, para 6.110.
instance, who failed to engage in such a reasonable scrutiny of his or her property over twelve years would be at risk from the operation of the doctrine. It is interesting to note that the authority that Gray and Gray claim for this final rule is an Australian case, Re Riley and the Real Property Act. 127 If, as the Law Commission appears to assume, this principle is not in fact present in the modern English common law of adverse possession, then the development of a stewardship approach to adverse possession could usefully incorporate such a rule. Otherwise, the risk of "anomalous" outcomes in the operation of the doctrine -that is, where a blameless landowner who has in fact satisfied the duty of stewardship still loses his land -could be said to render the overall system disproportionate under P1-1.
CONCLUSION
The object of this analysis has been to reconsider the raft of recent developments in the law of adverse possession by devising a formal taxonomy employing matrices of "fault" and "hardship". This type of taxonomic activity, we feel, has much to offer for scholars who wish to better understand "the purposes and principles that animate legal decision making" and, specifically, to consider the real values and issues at stake, although not always explicitly, in legal discourses around unlawful occupation.
The taxonomy set out in this article, derived from discourses of unlawful occupation in a range of legal contexts, also provides a useful lens through which to analyse the decisions of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the Pye litigation. While it is argued that, ultimately, the Grand Chamber decision is problematic in its attempt to justify the pre-2003 system of adverse possession on traditional grounds of limitation, the outcome of the Grand Chamber"s decision can be more appropriately re-imagined by refocusing attention upon the fault of the landowner -rather than fault of the squatter and the hardship to the landowner, as the contemporary discourse appears to demands -through a new discourse of land stewardship.
127 [1965] NSWR 994, 1001 per McLelland CJ.
